Can the United States and Israel prevent the Houthis from seizing more ships?

On Sunday, the Houthis seized a cargo ship in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen.

The Galaxy Leader, a 189-meter-long (620-foot-long) car carrier, was en route from Turkey to India when it was intercepted by small speedboats and boarded by armed uniformed men.

Others rappelled down from helicopters to the deck and ordered the crew to change course to the Yemeni port of Hodeidah.

No shots were fired and the seized vessel was a civilian vessel sailing between neutral countries, but the incident still threatens to spark the latest serious escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In a worst-case scenario, this could be the first step toward getting the United States and Iran directly involved in a war.

Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarrea confirmed that the ship had been seized because it was "owned by Israel," in line with his earlier statement that the Houthis would "not hesitate to target any Israeli ship in the Red Sea or anywhere we can reach." Israel has denied any connection to the ship, although ownership details in a public shipping database indicate that one of Israel's richest men owned it.

Most of the Red Sea is more than 200 kilometers (124 miles) wide, but its southern tip, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is a chokepoint less than 20 kilometers (12 miles) wide and runs from Yemen's Mayyun island through the shores of Djibouti and Eritrea. More than 17,000 ships pass through each year. Nearly 50 ships pass through each day.

Many of them have legal status, such as the Bahamian-flagged Galactic Leader, which is operated by a Japanese company and has a Bulgarian captain and crew from at least five other countries, none of whom are from Israel. In the complex world of shipping, ownership of a ship is less important than its flag, which represents its country of registration and the company it operates.

The Bahamas offers what it calls a "flag of convenience". It is a country with low taxes and liberal labor policies that has attracted operators to register ships there. The operating company is Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha), which operates 818 ships.

Nearly 1,500 ships pass through the strait each month, some of them potentially linked to Israel and therefore vulnerable to further hijacking by the Houthis.

Shipments must continue no matter what happens, so will all "Israel-linked" ships be at the mercy of the Houthis?

Perhaps not, but the options to prevent further hijackings are limited to three: send armed ships to escort commercial traffic, destroy or severely limit the Houthis' maritime offensive capabilities, and persuade them not to attack.

For the first option, the question is who can provide armed naval patrols in the Red Sea?

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are Red Sea coastal states with powerful and advanced navies. But Saudi Arabia is in an uneasy truce with the Houthis, and they are reluctant to disturb them. Egypt has tried to remain neutral and does not want to get caught up in tensions with the Houthis. Israel was unable to free up any ships for this task.

The only force left to deal with the Houthi threat will be the US Navy.

Since Oct. 7, the United States has deployed a number of assets to the Middle East, centered on two carrier strike groups (CSGS). CSG 12 in the Mediterranean Sea is led by the USS Gerald R. Ford, the newest and most modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. CSG 2 is currently in the Gulf of Oman, with the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in front. Each carrier is equipped with a guided missile cruiser, two or three destroyers, and an auxiliary fleet such as refueling tankers, supply ships, and mobile maintenance bases.

Both CSGS have a clear mandate: CSG 12 is tasked with monitoring the wider region of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq and acting against any threat that could escalate the conflict. CSG 2 is responsible for monitoring Iran and taking action against it if the situation escalates.

The USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier strike group was left outside the Strait of Hormuz, a direct message to Iran that the United States does not yet have hostile intentions. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has made it clear that Iran will continue to support Hamas and the Palestinian people, but does not want to start a war.

As a result, CSG 2 has shown a less bellicose intent to remain in the Gulf of Oman, from which its aircraft could still reach targets in Iran if needed, or perhaps enter the Gulf in the unlikely event that the United States wanted to escalate its threat.

In addition to the CSG, the U.S. Navy has individual ships monitoring Houthi missile launches. On October 19, the destroyer USS Carney successfully shot down several Houthi missiles and drones aimed at Israel.

Since all of these assets have specific missions, U.S. options are limited. The only ships available to escort commercial traffic are those clustered around the amphibious aircraft carrier Bataan, currently located south of Suez, and shifting them south would weaken the potential for the United States to respond to an escalation around Gaza.

This brings us to the second option. The Houthis are known for their readiness to confront more powerful enemies. The US targeting them directly could risk a serious escalation. Washington could ask Israel to target Houthi ports with long-range missiles, but even that would be risky.

So, we come to the third option, relegation.

Looks like Iran is the key again. If the hijacking of the Galactic Leader had been an independent act of the Houthis, rather than an incitement by Tehran, the United States could have engaged in quiet diplomacy to get Iran to rein in its proxies and avoid new maritime hijackings.

This may be the most realistic way forward, but only if all parties involved show restraint.

The stakes are high. Another interception could have a snowball effect, drawing other countries more actively into an already devastating conflict and pushing it beyond the point of no return.